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CASE NOTES
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES-LEHNHAUSEN V.
LAKE SHORE AUTO PARTS CO.
By a referendum vote in November, 1970, the people of Illinois
adopted the following amendment to the Constitution of 1870:
Article IX-A
Section I. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the taxation of
personal property by valuation is prohibited as to individuals.1
The official explanation which appeared on the referendum ballot stated
that the amendment would abolish the ad valorem personal property tax
levy against individuals, but the same tax levied against corporations and
other entities not considered individuals would not be affected. Later in
the session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 2 further clarifying
the legislature's intent that the effect of Article IX-A would be to "abolish
the ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person
or by two or more natural persons. .... 3
A subsequent action was brought by a Cook County corporation, in
which the trial court held that the provisions of the Revenue Act of 19394
as amended by Article IX-A violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The decision was appealed to the Illinois Su-
preme Court, which held that it is the discrimination against corporations
produced by Article IX-A itself that violates the equal protection clause
and therefore Article IX-A must fall.5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, reiterating the long-established doctrine that states may exercise
wide latitude in classifying for purposes of taxation without violating the
1. This amendment, the manner of its presentation to Illinois voters, and the
schedule of effectiveness are contained in Senate Joint Resolution 30. State of Illinois,
S. JOUR., 76th G.A., 3476 (June 30, 1969).
2. Senate Joint Resolution 67. State of Illinois, S. JOUR., 77th G.A., 4405 (May
19, 1970).
3. Id. The House concurred. State of Illinois, H. JOUR., 77th G.A., 7145 (May
29, 1970).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 482 et seq. (1971).
5. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 11. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592(1971), cert. granted sub nom., 406 U.S. 904 (1972).
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 41 U.S.L.W. 4289 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1973).1
In reviewing state taxing schemes, the Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to the principle that deference to the wisdom of the state legisla-
ture should be given as long as the tax classification is based upon a ra-
tional foundation and is not palpably arbitrary. 7 In Bell's Gap R.R. Co.
v. Pennsylvania," an 1890 case, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania tax stat-
ute against an equal protection attack. The doctrine enunciated in that
decision retains its vitality in 1973: "[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation.",,
The Court indicated that the equal protection clause would not prohibit
a state from adjusting its tax system in any way the people and the legis-
lature chose, so long as distinctions made among those who should bear
the burden of taxation were reasonably and properly enacted.10
Fifty years later, in Madden v. Kentucky," the Court restated the prin-
ciple that the fourteenth amendment requires "no iron rule of equality"
in state taxation schemes. Madden was a case challenging the validity of
6. Even though Illinois adopted a new constitution in 1970, the effect of this
amendment to the revenue article of the 1870 constitution carries over to the present.
Thus, a decision on the constitutionality of Article IX-A was not moot in 1973.
Article IX, sec. 5(c) of the present constitution states that the General Assembly
shall abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes on or before January 1, 1979,
and "thereafter shall replace all revenue lost . . . as a result of the abolition of ad
valorem personal property taxes subsequent to January 1, 1971. Such revenue
shall be replaced by imposing statewide taxes, other than ad valorem taxes on
real estate, solely on those classes relieved of the burden of paying ad valorem
personal property taxes because of the abolition of such taxes subsequent to January
2, 1971." The effective date of Article IX-A was January 1, 1971. Thus, because
individuals were relieved of the burden of paying ad valorem personal property
taxes prior to January 2, 1971, "replacement taxes" can be imposed upon corpora-
tions only.
For a discussion of the revenue article of the 1970 constitution, see Kamin, Con-
stitutional Abolition of Ad Valorem Personal Property Taxes: A Looking-Glass
Book, 60 ILL. B.J. 432 (1972). See also Whalen and Wolff, The Prudence of
Judicial Restraint Under the New Illinois Constitution, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 63,
68-69 (1972).
7. Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 527 (1959); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940). See also
Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in Cook County-The "Railroad Cases" and
the Future of De Facto Classification, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 212,
269 (1968).
8. 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
9. Id. at 237.
10. Id.
11. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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an ad valorem tax on bank deposits imposing a higher tax rate on de-
posits outside the state than upon those in state banks. Upholding the tax
classification, the Court said the passing of fifty years since its decision in
Bell's Gap had served to "underscore the wisdom" of the recognition that
wide areas of discretion are necessary for a state to formulate sound tax
policies. 1 2
In 1959, the Supreme Court reviewed an Ohio tax law which exempted
from ad valorem tax merchandise owned by nonresidents placed in Ohio
warehouses for storage purposes only, but did not exempt like merchan-
dise stored and owned by residents."' The Court referred again to the
"no iron rule of equality" doctrine:
The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. . . . Of
course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule
of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable
schemes of state taxation.
1 4
There are many other decisions that have relied upon the doctrine that
state tax classifications violate the equal protection clause only where it
can clearly be shown that the state had no reasonable, justifiable basis for
making a distinction between taxpayers.' 5 The argument has been made
that even though a state has great leeway in delineating classes upon
which a tax will fall, a distinction between corporations and individuals
does not provide such a basis. However, the validity of such a distinction
was upheld by the Court in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.16 The Court rea-
soned that these distinctions are supported by the significant differences
between corporate and non-corporate entities.' 7 Among the benefits which
inure to corporations, wrote the Court, are "[t]he continuity of the busi-
ness, without interruption by death or dissolution," the ease of transfer-
ring property interests through shares of stock, managerial control by a
board of directors, and the general absence of individual liability.' 8
12. Id. at 88.
13. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
14. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959);
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,
283 U.S. 527 (1931); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264 U.S.
22 (1924); Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U.S. 532 (1920); Common-
wealth v. Life Assurance Co. of Pa., 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965).
16. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
17. Id. at 161.
18. Id. at 162.
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Although the line of cases discussed above would seem to make clear
that the classification struck down by the llinois court in Lake Shore did
not violate the equal protection clause, a 1928 Supreme Court decision
held that if the character of the owner was the only distinction between
parties paying the tax and those exempt from it, then the tax classification
would violate the equal protection clause. Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania19 involved a tax on gross receipts imposed upon foreign or
domestic corporations operating taxicabs, but not upon individuals or part-
nerships in the same type of business. Since the tax was imposed only be-
cause the owner of a company happened to be a corporation, the Court
felt there was no "real" or "substantial" difference between the classes.
Thus, the Pennsylvania statute in issue was stricken as arbitrary and un-
justifiable under the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Brandeis dis-
sented, stating that the Flint decision had shown there is a real and not a
specious or fanciful distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
businesses. 20
Lake Shore had argued that the Quaker City doctrine should control
the Illinois question, and the state supreme court agreed.21 The Illinois
court also viewed the nature of the tax, as well as the nature of the thing
taxed, as a vital factor in its decision. 22
On review, the Supreme Court placed no importance whatsover upon the
difference in types of taxes. But faced with the disparities between
Quaker City and later decisions,2 3 the Court simply chose to dismiss
19. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
20. Id. at 403-12.
21. Brief for Respondent at 23, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 41
U.S.L.W. 4289 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1973). Oddly enough, the Illinois court cited from
the dissent in Quaker City, written by Justice Brandeis, who indicated the Penn-
sylvania tax classification did not violate the equal protection clause.
22. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 149, 273 N.E.2d 592,
598 (1971). The court apparently discussed the nature of a tax in order to distin-
guish Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969). Thorpe upheld a
newly-enacted state income tax which imposed a higher tax rate upon corporations
than individuals. The problem in Thorpe, though, was that the then-effective con-
stitution contained a provision prohibiting classification of property for taxation
purposes. A prior decision, Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932)
invalidated an income tax because the court considered income to be property, and
therefore all property (income) had to be taxed equally. To nullify the Bachrach
holding, Thorpe stated "the tax in question is not a property tax and therefore does
not come within the limitations ... our constitution imposes on property taxes."
43 111. 2d at 42, 250 N.E.2d at 636. Lake Shore was rendered consistent with
Thorpe by emphasizing the importance of the nature of the tax. That is, since the
tax was to be levied against corporate property rather than income, the classification
was improper.
23. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); White River Co. v.
Arkansas, 279 U.S. 692 (1929).
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Quaker City as a "relic of a bygone era."' 24 This dismissal amounts to a
sub silentio overruling of that case.
The law now seems clear. Quaker City was the one potential obstacle
faced by states in their tax treatment of corporations. Removing this
obstacle, the Court has implicitly recognized the revenue-raising problems
states must cope with and the necessity of using a wide range of tax plans
to solve them.
Shane H. Anderson
24. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4292.
